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ABSTRACT 
Though conventional methods of conducting terrorist attacks continue to be a 
highly effective way for violent non-state actors to achieve their goals, technological 
uncertainty drives a debate regarding the impacts of emerging technology on the modes 
of violence these actors will employ in the future. This is indicative of a potential puzzle, 
in that there is little predictive capability regarding which groups may seek to adopt 
technologies that are becoming available due to increasingly easy means of adoption. 
Previous work indicates a continuum of violence perpetuated by violent non-state actors 
that ranges from those that conduct limited acts of violence to the less constrained actors 
who may seek to carry out acts of mass destruction. Research into the less constrained 
groups suggests that, regardless of constraints, the more successful violent non-state 
actors gauge the level of violence needed to communicate their threat and avoid enemy 
overreaction while operating within the constraints set by their constituencies. 
Furthermore, the case studies contained herein suggest that, unless there is a preference 
for specific types of technology inherent to a group’s narrative, the actors will not 
necessarily reach for emerging technologies even when they decide to escalate the 
destructiveness of their attacks. 
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Violent non-state actors persist in their use of conventional attack methods despite 
the availability of more advanced technology. This is puzzling because accepted wisdom 
states that, if the technology is available, an actor will adopt it. The term “radical leveling 
technologies” was recently coined by Jennifer Snow to define a new set of technologies 
that can upset existing balances of power and potentially allow violent non-state actors 
access to increasingly destructive or disruptive technology that was previously out of their 
reach.1 This concept underlines the easing of technological barriers for both state and non-
state actors to obtain increasingly destructive/disruptive weapons.2 The tension between 
these two trends is indicative of a puzzle, in that there is little predictive capability 
regarding which groups will seek to adopt emerging or radical leveling technologies.  
Due to the nature of the problem, case studies involving violent non-state actors 
who conduct limited acts of violence would likely be irrelevant, as it is the less constrained 
violent non-state actors who are more likely to adopt technology that could cause mass 
destruction or disruption. Using the Possibility Principle, as delineated by James Mahoney 
and Gary Goertz, case selection for this thesis was dependent upon whether the “outcome 
of interest is possible.”3 Because of this principle, the sample of cases was restricted to 
those groups with a demonstrated willingness to engage in higher order violence. The cases 
selected from this delimited pool were Chechen separatists; the Covenant, the Sword and 
the Arm of the Lord (CSAL); and Aum Shinrikyo. 
This thesis used the qualitative methodology of process tracing, as defined by 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, to identify the causal chain between how the 
independent variables of a group’s goals and audience needs affected an actor’s chosen 
                                                 
1 Jennifer J. Snow, “Entering the Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling 
Technologies” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 1–4, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/
10945/47874. 
2 Snow, 1–4,  
3 James Mahoney, and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in 
Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 653–669, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041401. 
xii 
mode of violence.4 The independent variables influenced the violent non-state actor’s 
communication and signal needs and therefore affected their mode of violence. In turn, 
each actor’s choice of mode of violence yielded valuable clues regarding the conditions 
under which a less constrained actor reaches for more destructive modes of violence. This 
understanding can then be applied to the likelihood of an actor choosing to adopt emerging 
or radical leveling technologies if they are available to them. 
Ultimately, in the case of the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, and 
Aum Shinrikyo, the independent variables of goal and audience needs affected the 
selection of specific modes of violence. However, in the case of the Chechen separatists 
only the audience needs shifted, though that seems to have been sufficient to impact the 
dependent variable. Notably, except for the Aum case, where there was a stated 
predilection for advanced technologies,5 each case showed that even when the actors had 
the opportunity to pursue high-cost technology options they chose to continue their use of 
low-cost technologies, though the destructive capacity of their choices shifted. Both the 
Chechen separatists and CSAL had access to high-cost technology options and yet, with 
one exception, neither used them.  
Each actor was driven and constrained by their goals and narrative as well as their 
disparate audience needs. Interestingly, in all three cases, the actors constrained 
themselves. In the case of Aum, this constraint was likely due to the inconsistency of other 
modes of violence with their narrative; in the case of the Chechen separatists, likely due to 
the demonstrated inefficiency of using the more destructive modes of violence as a strategic 
tool; and for CSAL, likely due to a combination of their lack of belief in their narrative and 
minus an existential threat in the form of government countermeasures. These findings 
substantiate the idea that less constrained actors are more likely to reach for more 
destructive capabilities, but that the technology that they reach for must be consistent with 
their goals, narrative, and audience needs. 
                                                 
4 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies in Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 207. 
5 Adam Dolnik. Understanding Terrorism Innovation. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and 
Francis Group, 2007. 156, 173–175. 
xiii 
As the technology acquisition pathway shortens, and violent non-state actors have 
the option to more easily obtain high-cost technology, it is vital for the intelligence 
community, policy makers and their advisors to understand potential points of interdiction 
or influence. This understanding could introduce the potential to prevent high-cost 
technology acquisition by affecting the behavior of the audiences of these violent non-state 
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We are living in an age that presents unique opportunities and inimitable dangers that, 
when viewed through the long lens of history, will likely be defined by the swift pace of its 
technological advancements and the leveling of the information playing field. In the next 
decade, we can expect to see the continued acceleration of emerging technologies in the form 
of information communications technologies, artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, 
additive manufacturing, and biotechnology.1 This has profound implications for state 
security. Rapid technological growth has historically introduced increased uncertainty into the 
international system regarding the capabilities of adversaries. Technological uncertainty today 
is further complicated by the increased threat from violent non-state actors (VNSAs).2  
Technological uncertainty coupled with an ever-growing threat palette has aggravated 
the debate about the potential negative implications on the balance of power in the 
international system, explicitly regarding the acquisition of emerging technology. Emerging 
technology potentially increases the destructive capability of VNSAs and the potential 
consequences of that acquisition on the power dynamics between state and non-state actors.3 
Despite these evolving concerns, conventional methods of conducting terrorist attacks have 
been and continue to be a highly effective way for VNSAs to affect their operational goals. 
Underlining this point, is that even attacks involving the more sophisticated groups of VNSAs 
are primarily carried out using conventional technology.4 Though some scholars argue that it 
has been feasible for certain VNSAs to adopt and use nuclear, biological and chemical 
                                                 
1 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends Paradox of Progress, 2017 (Washington, DC: ODNI, 
2017), 6, 14–16, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf; Jennifer J. Snow, “Entering 
the Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies,” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2015), 1–4, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/47874. 
2 Emily O. Goldman., Power in Uncertain Times. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 1–
11, 12–35, 125–161.  
3 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends Paradox of Progress, 6, 14–16; Snow, “Entering the 
Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies,” 3–4. 
4 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,” in Technology and 
Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1993), 12. 
2 
weapons for several years, few have attempted to do so; those who have, have failed to use 
the capability in a manner consistent with the definition of “weapons of mass destruction.”5  
The persistent use of conventional attack methods by VNSAs, despite the availability 
of more advanced technology, is indicative of a puzzle. There is little understanding of why 
VNSAs choose to adopt certain technologies, the assumption being that if technology will 
allow a group to cause more damage, the technology will be adopted; however, this might not 
be true.6 The puzzle is that there is little predictive capability regarding which groups may 
seek to adopt technologies that are becoming available due to the shortening of the 
technological pathway.  
There has been some work in this area by terrorism scholars that indicates a continuum 
of acceptable violence amongst VNSAs that ranges from those who conduct limited acts of 
violence, to the less constrained actors who may seek to carry out acts of mass destruction 
(see Figure 1).7 One commonality, however, is that regardless of the differences amongst the 
disparate groups, each of them attempts to leverage its actions to achieve its aims. Successful 
VNSAs can gauge the level of violence that most effectively communicates their threat and 
mitigates the risk of enemy government overreaction, while operating within the constraints 
set by their constituencies. It is important to note that the parameters of this relationship will 
vary among different VNSAs.8 For instance, actors who are pursuing a provocation strategy 
will often attempt to purposefully provoke the enemy government into an unthinking response 
                                                 
5 Richard Clutterbuck, “Trends in Terrorist Weaponry,” in Technology and Terrorism, ed. Paul 
Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group,1993), 130–139; Zachary Davis, 
“Strategic Latency and World Order,” Orbis (Winter 2011): 73–74, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.006; 
Gavin Cameron, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research: Past and Future,” in Research on 
Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 74–90. 
6 Clutterbuck, “Trends in Terrorist Weaponry,” 130–139. 
7 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 152–
168; Randall D. Law. Terrorism: A History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 274–275; Bruce 
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2017), 81; 
Andrew Silke, “An Introduction to Terrorism Research,” in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements 
and Failures, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 18–22; Adam Dolnik, Understanding 
Terrorism Innovation (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group), 1–3. 
8 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 173–196, 229–256. 
3 
which can contribute to the radicalization of the populace.9 That said, it is not difficult to posit 
that there may be a relationship between the modes of violence that a violent non-state actor 
will use to carry out their activities, the constraints placed upon them by their disparate 
audiences, and the need to prevent increased enemy government attention.  
Each of the case studies within this thesis substantiates the supposition that there is a 
relationship that exists between modes of violence, constraints and the need to operate under 
the government radar. Notably, this thesis focuses on the idea of mode of violence versus the 
technology used, due to the dearth of cases in which VNSAs have used emerging technology. 
The intent is to generalize the tactics and technology into two categories of modes of violence 
to allow conclusions to be drawn about the likelihood of technology adoption by similar future 
actors. Interestingly, each case study verifies that the violent non-state actor inherent to the 
case was reactive to some degree to the aforementioned variables. For instance, to varying 
degrees, each actor studied constrained themselves to certain modes of violence based upon 
their goals and audience needs. Understanding this constraint is central to solving the puzzle. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
After the completion of an initial literature review, three key research questions are 
identified as essential to understanding each group’s audience needs and their effect on modes 
of violence selected by each actor. The first question was concerned with the disparities 
amongst groups who operate under fewer constraints in their use of violence than others, 
specifically whether there is an acceptable violence continuum even among the most extreme 
VNSAs. The second question was whether any patterns of constraint could be identified 
between each group and its different audiences, and, further, whether these constraints 
influenced the group’s modes of violence. The third question centered around whether 
conclusions could be drawn between goals, audience needs, and the choice of specific modes 
of violence.  
As will be discussed in depth in this thesis, the case studies under review are those 
pertaining to VNSAs that are perceived to operate under less constraints and are therefore 
                                                 
9 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, 
no. 1 (Summer 2006): 51. 
4 
more likely to embrace more destructive methods. Among those studied, two of the groups, 
Aum Shinrikyo and the Chechen separatists, were more prone to destructive modes of 
violence than CSAL. That said, it is perhaps not surprising that the latter was more reactive 
to their audience needs and lacked the goal conviction of the other two groups. Further, while 
all three groups reacted or altered their modes of violence in response to their audience needs, 
both Aum Shinrikyo and CSAL went so far as to change goals in response to those needs. In 
the end, this discussion establishes a basic understanding of the relationship between some 
predictable VNSAs and any potential technological constraints based upon of their influence 
needs for each of their audiences. 
B. APPROACH  
1. Pool of Actors 
When reviewing this puzzle, it is essential to evaluate relevant case studies. Due to the 
nature of the problem, case studies involving VNSAs who conduct limited acts of violence 
would likely be irrelevant as it is the less constrained VNSAs whom are more likely to adopt 
technology that could cause mass destruction or disruption. Using the possibility principle, as 
delineated by James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, case selection for this thesis was dependent 
upon whether the “outcome of interest is possible.”10 Because of this principle the cases 
chosen were selected in part due to the possibility that the violent non-state actor would choose 
to adopt advanced technology for an enhanced destructive capability.11  
In addition to their adherence to the possibility principle, the three groups represented 
in the case studies are meant to be representative of the plethora of violent non-state actor 
groups that fall within the less constrained side of the continuum of violence (see Figure 1). 
Essentially each group adhered to three crucial criteria. Each had an evolutionary path that 
affected their audience needs; each targeted civilians, and each was perceived to have limited 
constraints on their use of violence. As previously mentioned, the groups chosen are the 
                                                 
10 James Mahoney, and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in 
Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 653, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041401. 
11 Mahoney, and Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative 
Research,” 653–654. 
5 
Chechen Separatists; CSAL, a U.S. Christian Identity group; and Aum Shinrikyo. Notably, 
none of these groups fit neatly within general interpretations of terrorist groups. 
Terrorism is commonly viewed through the lens of ethnonationalism, revolutionary 
leftism or jihadism.12 However, it has also been adopted as a strategy by groups that do not 
adhere to these narratives, including purely apocalyptic and political extremist groups. 
Apocalyptic groups have been known to use terrorism not only to bring attention to their 
cause, but also to wage war against their enemies. Examples of these groups are cults, right-
wing extremists, religious extremists or lone wolf entities. The political extremist groups are 
those that generally believe in conventional political goals, but with a dangerous amount of 
conviction, examples of these groups are generally eco-terrorists or anti-abortion activists.13 
While the latter have some relevance to this discussion, the three case studies in this thesis 
will focus on the apocalyptic groups.  
 
 
Figure 1. The continuum of violence14 
                                                 
12 Law, Terrorism: A History, 316–329. 
13 Law, 316–329. 
14 Adapted from Law, Terrorism: A History; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism; The idea to introduce the 
concept of whether the groups goals were pragmatic to the continuum of violence was given to me by Dr. 




Process tracing will be used to identify the causal chain between two independent 
variables: goals and influence needs with a dependent variable of the differing modes of 
violence to include the tactics and technology used to affect that violence. This will allow 
for full consideration of one or more causal pathways that will hopefully lead to an 
understanding of the constraints among violent non-state actor groups with minimal 
restraints on their activities.15 The intent of this thesis is to see whether arguments can be 
built based upon the data derived from the case studies. As discussed by Derek Beach and 
Rasmus Brun Pedersen, theory-building process-tracing is a process which attempts to 
construct a theory that describes a causal mechanism that can be applied to more than one 
case without claiming that the identified mechanism alone is enough to explain the 
outcome.16 A key aspect of case study analysis is the identification of independent 
variables to provide the foundation of the study and the dependent variable to comprehend 
the puzzle of which VNSAs may seek to adopt emerging technologies.17  
Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter give us a framework by which to understand the 
goals and strategies of VNSAs by differentiating between the ultimate desires of the group 
(goals) and the plans of action to attain those goals (strategies).18 According to Kydd and 
Walter, to carry out these goals the organization needs to both gain and maintain influence 
over their disparate audiences, to include the government that they are seeking to impact 
and the populace or individuals whose support or compliance the group is trying to acquire. 
Further, the authors argue that terror as carried out by non-state actors is a form of signaling 
that is used to influence their audiences ergo the strategy and mode of violence that each 
actor adopts will depend upon their audience needs (see Figure 2).19 For instance, when 
                                                 
15 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 207.  
16 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013. 9–22, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=3415124. 
17 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 79.  
18 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52, 58. 
19 Kydd and Walter, 52, 58. 
7 
the Islamic International Brigade invaded Dagestan in 1999 it was with the intention of 
provoking the Russians into an unthinking retaliatory response that would radicalize the 
members of the populace who had yet to choose a side. Unfortunately for the Islamic 
International Brigade they had miscalculated the response of both the Russians and the 
Dagestani populace to their choice of signals.20 
Signaling is introduced in game theory as a game where the players have private 
information which their opponents do not know. Signaling is extremely important in games 
with repeated interactions where an entity’s decisions could be colored by their opponents’ 
threats and promises regarding future deeds.21 This has significant implications to the 
puzzle at the center of this thesis. If as game theory suggests, private information increases 
uncertainty and impedes communication attempts by the actors involved, then the signals 
that they send to one another are extremely significant in determining how each will 
respond to the other.22 This is perhaps especially true of conflict between VNSAs and 
states wherein the state often lacks knowledge regarding the resources and goals of the 
violent non-state actor and the different sides regularly issue both threats and promises in 
order to advance their individual end-states.23  
The supposition that the use of terror is a game of signaling is further discussed by 
Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, where they define terrorism as “a signaling game 
in which terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group’s character and objectives to a 
                                                 
20 Robert W. Schaefer. The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazahat to Jihad. 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 179–187; Dodge Billingsley, Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen 
Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars 1994 – 2009 (England: Helion & Company Limited, 2013), 2, 3–4. 
Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 51; Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 1 (January 2005) 43–
44, https://doi.org/10.1080/0966813052000314101. 
21 Robert Gibbons, “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
11, no. 1 (February 1, 1997: 138, 140, 142, 144–145, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.1.127. 
22 Gibbons, “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory,”: 138, 140, 142, 144–145; Todd Sandler 
and Daniel G. Arce, “Terrorism and Game Theory,” Simulation & Gaming 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 
319–320, https://doi-org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1177%2F1046878103255492. 
23 Gordon H McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerilla Mobilization,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28. No. 2 (Feb. 2007) 295–320. Sandler and Arce, 
“Terrorism and Game Theory,” 320, 333. 
8 
set of target audiences.”24 The authors posit that terrorism is a means by which VNSAs 
use modes of violence to gain leverage where they do not have alternate means to affect 
their end-state. However, in order to maintain relevancy, they must also sustain their 
presence as a violent actor. In order to do this the actors must create a signal, generally 
based upon their targets and tactics, to reinforce the perception of their audiences that the 
actor is strong enough to carry out their threats (see Figure 2).25  There are several examples 
of VNSAs who successfully used signaling to affect their goals, to include current US-
Taliban negotiations, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia and the withdrawal of 
Spanish troops from Iraq and Afghanistan following the Madrid bombings.26 In sum, the 
signals that are sent by the VNSAs in a conflict are often inherent to their strategies and 
are frequently communicated via their chosen mode of violence. 
 
Figure 2. Pathway to mode of violence27 
                                                 
24 Bruce Hoffman, and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 (July 1, 2004): 243. 
25 Hoffman and McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” 245–248. 
26 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The US-Taliban negotiations breakthrough: What it means and what lies 
ahead,” Brookings, January 29, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/29/the-
us-taliban-negotiations-breakthrough-what-it-means-and-what-lies-ahead/; “Black Hawk Down: The 
Somali battle that changed U.S. policy in Africa,” BBC, February 1, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/
magazine-38808175/black-hawk-down-the-somali-battle-that-changed-us-policy-in-africa; “Group 
threatens to turn Spain into ‘inferno’,” MSNBC, April 5, 2004, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4651993/ns/
us_news-security/t/group-threatens-turn-spain-inferno/#.XNzvsshKiUk. 
27 Adapted from McCormick and Horton and Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics 
of Internal Wars,” 321–367; McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerilla Mobilization,” 295–320; Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 152–168; Kydd and Walter, “The 
Strategies of Terrorism,” 49–79; Gibbons, “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory,”127-149; Sandler 
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The previous discussion is the foundation behind the identification of the 
independent and dependent variables that will be used in this thesis. Each case study will 
look at two independent variables and one dependent variable to identify similar causal 
pathways amongst the three groups. The variables are as follows: 
Independent Variables: 
• Goals of the group 
• Audience and relationship to constituency 
Dependent Variable: 
• Mode of violence 
C. CATEGORIZING TERRORISM 
Panic Terror, called so from the fables, that make Pan the author of them; 
whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth first, some 
apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example, every one 
supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens to 
none but in a throng or multitude of people.  
 —Thomas Hobbes28 
Terrorism is a term that has no agreed-upon definition. That said, terrorism is 
commonly viewed within the context of coercive intimidation or the creation and exploitation 
of fear, with violent groups using acts or threats of violence against the innocent to force a 
target to alter its behavior. This is predicated upon fear and the belief that the group can and 
will carry out their threats.29 Stated simply, terrorism is influence brought about by the 
manufacture and manipulation of the fear of being hurt to effect a desired change within the 
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system. This reinforces the idea that a violent non-state actor needs to maintain the fear of its 
target audience to enhance or carry out their different goals: this can mean diverse things 
depending on the objectives of the violent non-state actor.30 It is important to note that most 
viewpoints of terrorism often lend themselves to the abnegation of the idea that VNSAs 
represent a subset of a population within larger socioeconomic systems.31 This concept is 
suggestive of the view that these groups are subject to one degree or another to the demands 
and needs of the populace of which they are a part.  
Terrorism has been described as “the theatre of the macabre”32 and is intended to 
injure an enemy politically and psychologically. Though this is an accurate interpretation, 
often when it is viewed this way, VNSAs are perceived to be either crazed or irrational.33 
This can result in a certain obliviousness regarding both the internal rationality of violent acts 
and the idea that VNSAs want to win whatever it is that they are fighting for or against. In 
almost every case, a VNSA’s goal is in direct opposition to that of the goals of the state 
wherein the group’s goal is to either to displace or to force the state to grant them concessions. 
That said, its objective is to grow large enough in resources (people, guns, and money) to do 
so, whereas the objective of the state is to prevent that from happening. It is essentially a 
competition over political space with terrorism as the strategy.34  
VNSAs are generally founded around a core of hard-core supporters, but they must 
also get big enough to “win.” However, the decision to support one side or another is often 
influenced not only by the individual’s preferences, but also by the individual’s interactions 
with others and their perception of events.35 Stated simply, VNSAs need populace support 
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and the time in which to gain it while conducting terrorist activities; how much support they 
need is dependent upon what their end state is. 
VSNA goals, strategies, modes of violence and weapons are intrinsically linked.36 
Actors with pragmatic politically minded goals, like some revolutionary terrorist groups, 
generally have a broad domestic constituency, and are focused on mobilizing the populace 
and building sympathy. As such they are more likely to focus on the theatre aspect of terrorism 
vice the macabre. Ethno-nationalist VNSAs that are hoping to effect the withdrawal of an 
occupier often design their strategy around spoiling and provocation and are, therefore, more 
violent than revolutionary terrorists like Narodnaya Volya.37 On the other end of the 
spectrum, VNSAs with less pragmatic political, religious or apocalyptic goals generally have 
minimal interest in gaining the support of the enemy populace. Further, they are often the 
most violent, largely because their worldview frequently promotes violence as a sanctified act 
within the group’s narrative though constraints can be placed upon them by their 
constituencies.38 In sum, groups with more pragmatic (achievable) goals generally use 
terrorism as a strategy to correct a defect in a disequilibrated system, but those with less 
pragmatic goals often want to erase the existing social structure.39 Groups that desire the 
erasure of the existing social structure often have a dualist perspective. 
A dualist perspective is one that perceives people as “good or evil” or “us versus 
them.” It is important to note that any violent non-state actor group can adopt or evolve into 
having a dualist perspective though most such groups generally have a predisposition towards 
dualism in their group narratives. As can be seen in the case studies, dualism is often a justifier 
in increasing modes of violence and the decreasing of constraints.40 To better scope the 
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discussion of these actors a brief overview of the terminology relevant to these groups is 
necessary before moving on. 
Though many are somewhat familiar with groups with apocalyptic narratives like al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State, few understand purely apocalyptic groups; the term apocalyptic 
millennial group covers a range of entities, from Islam and the Catholic Church to Scientology 
and Aum Shinrikyo. The interesting question is how does a group transition from belief in the 
Second Coming of Christ to a belief that their group is the only thing standing between 
humanity and the apocalypse? Millennialism is a belief in the collective salvation of a select 
group. Some apocalyptic millennial groups believe that by being faithful and waiting, 
salvation will come, some are armed and will defend themselves if they think they are under 
attack, still others believe that a divine or superhuman plan empowers them to overthrow the 
existing social or political structure.41 Catastrophic millennial groups have a pessimistic view 
of history’s projection in that they believe things are only worsening, and that to achieve the 
collective salvation of the group, the existing social and political structures must be destroyed 
and created anew. Conversely, progressive millennial groups tend to believe that the “end” 
will arrive non-catastrophically via cooperation with the divine or superhuman will.42 
Another example of a dualist perspective that will be discussed in this thesis is right wing 
terrorism. 
Right-wing terrorism is commonly perceived to be among the most irrational kind of 
contemporary violence, largely because the attacks targeting immigrants, minorities and 
refugees are often viewed as unsophisticated and unthinking violence.43 This is not 
necessarily an accurate perception. Many right-wing extremists earnestly believe that the very 
survival of their nations depends upon the removal of whomever they have designated as 
“other” and therefore detrimental to the safety and strength of “their” nation and society. As 
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unpalatable as it is to believe, this form of violent non-state actor does not operate merely to 
target as many “others” as possible, but because they view their group as a catalyst that will 
incite the establishment of a new government. That said, they formulate their violence per 
their constituency and with few exceptions will operate below a perceived threshold of 
violence to prevent suppressive actions from the government.44  
As discussed in the preceding pages, groups with less pragmatic goals have fewer 
constraints placed upon them by their disparate audiences in regard to their violent acts and 
as such are more likely to carry out actions that would be considered abhorrent by the 
constituencies of more pragmatically minded, violent non-state actor groups. That said, we 
can posit that their modes of violence are also less constrained, perhaps because their signal 
needs to communicate their commitment to their goal on a wider scale than a group that likely 
has a larger constituency and a better chance of negotiations. Further, by understanding the 
relationship between these types of groups and their audiences’ experts can make assessments 
regarding future attempted usage of emerging technology.  
D. MODES OF VIOLENCE: TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Terrorists use the gun and the bomb as delivery systems for the real coercive 
instruments in their arsenal: surprise and shock. 
 Daniel R. Morris45 
Arguably, when one asks a layperson about terrorism in the modern age, that person’s 
response will likely correlate in some way to suicide bombing. If we were to break down what 
a basic suicide bombing entails, it would consist of the individual as the carrier, the vest, the 
explosives, and the trigger; the suicide bombing is the mode of violence that in turn is 
composed of smaller “technologies”46 which allow the mode of violence to be carried out. 
Imagine for a moment that the explosives were packed with radioactive material; though the 
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mode of violence remains the same, the level of destruction, risk and fear associated with our 
hypothetical group and their mode of violence would increase exponentially. Suicide bombing 
is just one example of the different modes of violence used by VNSAs to affect their goals. 
The decision to adopt suicide bombing is a strategic signaling choice used to support disparate 
groups’ goals.47 As previously discussed, this thesis is focused on the idea of mode of violence 
as an inherent strategy choice that is made up of both tactics and technology. Scoping mode 
of violence in this manner allows for a better understanding of the groups that adopt more 
destructive modes of violence and are therefore more likely to reach for more advanced 
technology.  
Technology has been defined in a variety of ways throughout history; the definitions 
range from very specific to the more general that can encompass the idea of technology as 
one component, as well as the concept of technology as a Carrier Strike Group.48 Rapid 
technological advancements and our changing understanding of technology further 
complicate our ability to define it. As an example, emerging and disruptive technologies have 
been variously described as scientific discoveries that can allow small groups and individuals 
to obtain technological parity with states or large organizations, as “strategic” technologies,49 
or more specifically as defined by Snow as, “radical leveling technologies.”50  
Snow coined the term radical leveling technologies to define the new set of 
technologies that can upset existing balances of power and potentially allow VNSAs access 
to increasingly destructive or disruptive technology that was previously out of their reach. Her 
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thesis underlines the shortening of the technological pathway for both state and non-state 
actors for increasingly destructive/disruptive weapons.51 This concept is essential to 
understanding the puzzle contained within this thesis. By understanding the intricacies of the 
relationships between a VNSA, their different audiences and the modes of violence adopted, 
we can potentially understand which actors may adopt emerging technology and possibly 
where pressure can be applied in order to mitigate the risks posed by these shortened 
pathways. 
As previously discussed, the juxtaposition of technology and terrorism is an 
understudied relationship,52 and, as such, it is vital to look at technology within the context of 
its use by VNSAs as a subset to their disparate modes of violence as opposed to a more general 
interpretation. With that said, this thesis will use W. Brian Arthur’s technological principles 
and apply them to our understanding of technology in the case studies contained herein.53 
This thesis posits that Arthur’s concept can be applied to the study of the relationship between 
less constrained VNSAs and technology by looking at their use of technology to carry out 
violent acts as a mode of violence (suicide terrorism) as opposed to merely the use of a tool 
(AK-47). As there are currently no known cases of terrorist attacks using emerging technology 
or radical leveling technologies, this will allow us to generalize the types of attacks based 
upon the signal that the actor is hoping to communicate by their use of specific modes of 
violence. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the case studies contained herein, while the type of tool 
used in the mode of violence did not necessarily change with the shifting of the independent 
variables what did change was the level of destruction sought by the violent non-state actor. 
As an example, while the Chechen separatists ineffectively utilized a “dirty bomb”54 and had 
numerous plans to attack nuclear facilities,55 their preferred mode of violence remained the 
use of innovative or conventional means to conduct attacks with an increased destructive 
capability. The one actor who preferred using advanced, chemical and biological weapons 
was Aum Shinrikyo. Interestingly, this supplements the findings of Adam Dolnik in that he 
determines that it is the actor’s attachment to a particular type of weaponry or innovation 
process that is the strongest characteristic in a group’s decision to innovate.56 
Each mode of violence discussed throughout the remainder of this thesis will be 
placed into a category of either high-cost technology or low-cost technology with the 
following definitions: 
• High-Cost Technology: mode of violence using advanced, chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear tools 
• Low-Cost Technology: mode of violence using conventional or innovative 
tools 
The intent of bracketing the modes of violence in this manner is to allow a better 
understanding of the groups that adopt more destructive modes of violence using conventional 
technology vice those that do so using more advanced technology. As previously stated, with 
no known cases of terrorist attacks using emerging technology or radical leveling 
technologies, the hope is that this will allow us to generalize the types of attacks based upon 
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each actors shifting modes of violence. Notably, both low-cost and high-cost technology 
attacks can have measurable effects on disparate organizations target audiences. Consider the 
effects of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 or the September 11, 2001 attacks juxtaposed 
against the Tokyo subway attacks in 1995. The Oklahoma City and the September 11th 
attacks were low-cost technology attacks and the Tokyo subway attacks were high-cost 
technology attacks. Which had more psychological impact? Which had the most far-reaching 
effects? 
In the following pages process tracing will be used to determine whether there are one 
or more causal pathways between the independent variables of goals and influence needs and 
the dependent variable of mode of violence. The independent variables will influence the 
violent non-state actor’s communication and signal needs and will therefore affect their mode 
of violence. In turn, each actor’s choice of mode of violence can yield valuable clues regarding 
the conditions under which a less constrained actor will reach for more destructive modes of 
violence (see Figure 3). This understanding can then be applied to the likelihood of an actor 
choosing to adopt emerging or radical leveling technology if it is available to them.  
Figure 3. Pathway to mode of violence. Figure repeated from page 8 for 
readers’ convenience.57 
57 Adapted from McCormick and Horton and Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics 
of Internal Wars,” 321–367; McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
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and Arce, “Terrorism and Game Theory,” 319–337. Hoffman, and McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and 
Suicide Attack,” 243. 
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E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters, beginning with the case studies in 
Chapters II-IV in the following order: Chechen Separatists; the Covenant, the Sword and 
the Arm of the Lord; and Aum Shinrikyo. Chapter II shows the evolution of the Chechen 
Separatists from a conventional force to one with an increasingly dualist perspective that 
began to reach for progressively destructive modes of violence to affect their end state. 
Chapter III shows the evolution of the Covenant, the Sword and Arm of the Lord from a 
small religious group to one whom was eventually charged with sedition against the United 
States government. Chapter IV shows the evolution of Aum Shinrikyo from a yoga and 
meditation group to one whom sought to overthrow the Japanese government using high-
cost technologies. Notably, each of these actors shifted their mode of violence in 
conjunction with a change in either one or both independent variables. Chapter V will seek 
to apply the arguments from our comparative case studies specifically as they apply to 
establishing a foundational understanding of the technological choices made within groups 
operating on the right hand side of the continuum of violence. The finding that except for 
the Aum case where there was a stated predilection for advanced technologies each case 
showed that even when the actors had the option to pursue high-cost technology options 
they chose to continue their use of low-cost technology, though the destructive capacity of 
their choices shifted, has particular significance to future analysis. Specifically, when 





II. CHECHEN SEPARATISTS 
The Chechen Separatists were a group that evolved from a conventional force to a 
force that increasingly turned to the targeting of civilians in an escalating attempt to 
influence the Russian government to negotiate the secession and self-determination of 
Chechnya. They were selected for this study because of their evolutionary path towards a 
dualist perspective, their targeting of civilians and the limited constraints under which they 
operated. Ultimately, it was found that during each phase of the conflict the constraints 
placed upon the Chechens by their audiences shifted, further, their influence needs shifted 
as their constraints changed. More importantly, as their constraints lowered and their goal 
became less achievable, their perspective became increasingly dualist and their modes of 
violence shifted to reflect the desperation that the separatists felt at being unable to affect 
their end state. Essentially, as they became more desperate, the modes of violence that they 
chose became either more destructive or more brutal. The intent in the following case study 
is to present a narrative of the Chechen conflict from its inception until the end of the 
second Russian-Chechen war followed by an analysis of the two independent variables 
(shifting goals and audience needs) and how they affected the dependent variable (mode 
of violence chosen). 
A. PRE-WAR PERIOD: POLITICS AND PREPARATION 
On November 1, 1991, popularly elected Chechen President Dzhochar Dudajev 
announced Chechnya’s independence and secession from Russia, beginning a decades-
long struggle for stability.58 By April 1993, internal divisions had led the Chechen 
Parliament to conduct a vote of no-confidence in President Dudajev and his Council of 
Ministers; impeachment proceedings were initiated in May. Following that, a small number 
of pro-Moscow administrative districts announced that they intended to secede from 
Grozny, escalating internal tensions to the point that clashes took place between President 
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Dudajev’s forces and the opposition. Further, an opposition-backed referendum was held 
on June 15, 1993, wherein most voters voted against President Dudajev’s continued rule. 
It is important to note, however, that fewer than 36,000 people were estimated to have 
voted in the referendum. To mitigate dissatisfaction, Dudajev altered his Council of 
Ministers to include the opposition. This did not stem the internal strife.59 
Having denounced Chechnya’s right to self-determination in 1991, but then largely 
doing nothing, Moscow began its support to the opposition in August 1994. This resulted 
in a disastrous Russian-backed attempt to take the city of Grozny.60 The strategy for taking 
Grozny was underpinned by faulty information and inaccurate analysis of the situation in 
Chechnya. The attack included Russian weaponry and officers who had been recruited by 
the Russian Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (FSK), Moscow was so confident of 
success that it had Interior Ministry troops on standby to assist in restoring order following 
the successful attack on November 25, 1994.61 It was a humiliating defeat; so much so that 
the when 70 Russian servicemen were apprehended Dudajev stated that they would be tried 
under Sharia law and executed. Shortly after that, President Yeltsin signed a decree to 
restore law and order in Chechnya to take effect on December 1, 1994, and Russian troops 
entered Chechnya on December 11, 1994.62 
B. 1994–1996 RUSSIAN-CHECHEN WAR 
Once Russia decided to use force in Chechnya, the rest of the conflict can be broken 
up into three periods: the preparations of the Russian armed forces to mount an incursion 
into Chechnya coupled with air strikes against military objectives; the movement of the 
Russians into Chechnya and the takeover of the Presidential Palace in Grozny; and the 
expansion of combat into the flatlands and mountains, which was terminated due to the 
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terrorist attack by Shamil Basayev in Budionovsk. It is important to break out each of these 
periods, as the range of factors and constraints inherent to each drove the use of technology 
by Chechen forces.63 Before doing so, however, it is important to understand the military 
and weapons status of the Dudajev’s forces at the onset of the first conflict. 
The formation of the Chechen armed forces had begun almost immediately 
following President Dudajev’s election.64 Soviet withdrawal allowed the Chechens to take 
over functioning military bases, training centers, and other facilities, as well as relevant 
weapons and military equipment. By the end of 1992, Chechnya had a regular army, 
National Guard, self-defense units, the presidential guard, the armed formations of the 
Caucasus Nations Confederation, and disparate units under Internal Affairs Ministry and 
the National Security Service. Further, almost 80% of all Russian weapons and equipment 
within Chechnya was eventually co-opted by the Chechen armed forces.65 Reportedly, the 
Chechen government was able to acquire approximately 40,000 automatic weapons, 153 
cannons, and mortars, 42 tanks, 18 vehicle mounted rocket guns, 55 armored personnel 
carriers, 130,000 hand grenades, 240 training airplanes, five fighters, and two 
helicopters.66 That said, the Russians were not the only source of arms, as porous borders 
and poor weapons control allowed for a free flow of weaponry into Chechnya.67 The 
acquisition of this equipment significantly changed the internal dynamics of Chechnya, in 
that local military organizations emerged, and an emotionally charged “people’s war” 
mentality took hold.68 
During the first and second periods of the conflict (27 October–10 December 1994 
and 11 December 1994–19 January 1995), the Russian Army was responsible for the 
disarmament of “illegal armed formations” and the establishment of martial law in 
                                                 
63 Knezys and Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, 3–6. 
64 Knezys and Sedlickas, 33–37. 
65 Knezys and Sedlickas, 33–37. 
66 Knezys and Sedlickas, 38–39; Valery Tishkov, Chechnya - Life in a War-Torn Society. (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2004), 64. 
67 Knezys and Sedlickas, 39; Tishkov, 64. 
68 Tishkov, 64. 
22 
Chechnya. However, they underestimated both the Chechen forces and the broader 
populace. In their preparatory stage, the Russian Army had failed to account for the 
strength of the Chechen forces. They did not have the support of the local populace, their 
units were poorly resourced, and the command structure was bogged down by confusion 
and bureaucracy.69 Illustrative of this, on December 21, 1994, there was an estimated 40-
mile long human chain of Chechen civilians along the Moscow-Baku highway protesting 
the assault on Grozny, several with banners declaring sentiments such as “Chechnya will 
always be free.”70 This protest reportedly resulted in several key Russian Commanders 
stating on television that they would not lead their soldiers into Chechnya.71 Despite this, 
Russia continued a heavy bombardment campaign in the city of Grozny and the Director 
of the FSK, Sergei Stepashin, stated that mercenaries and mujahedeen from Afghanistan 
and Latvia were amplifying Chechen ranks.72 Conversely, the Chechen separatists were 
well resourced and were able to utilize simple and yet effective tactics to counter the 
Russians that were supplemented by their light equipment, portable antitank weapons, their 
mobility, and their use of all technology in support of their “attack and retreat” tactics.73  
During and immediately following the battle of Grozny, members of the Chechen 
government, the Russian government, and the international community expressed concern 
over the barbarity of Russian methods.74 Notably, the Russian Duma and the Russian 
Human Rights Commissioner appealed to President Yeltsin to cease the massacre of non-
combatants with indiscriminate bombing and to reopen negotiations. Further, the Russian 
Military Council of the Internal Forces of the Interior Ministry disseminated a pamphlet to 
Russian troops that denounced the looting and cruelty towards Chechen civilians. The 
United States, France, and Germany also voiced apprehension over the civilian casualties 
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in the city.75 In June 1995, a Russian-based human rights organization called “Memorial” 
published two studies on civilian deaths in Chechnya that documented the November 
1994–January 1995 assaults on Grozny and the April 1995 assault on the town of 
Samashki. The Grozny report listed approximately 25,000 non-combatants and 3700 
children under the age of 15 as having been killed in the assault, and the Samashki report 
listed 107 non-combatants killed.76  
After the fall of Grozny, the Russians began shifting their focus to capturing the 
Chechen-controlled areas outside of Grozny, and Chechen fighters moved south to recover 
and regroup in the southern Caucasus Mountains. This began a period of guerilla warfare 
against a superior force.77 Throughout this period, President Dudajev offered the Russian 
High Command several opportunities for a cease-fire to allow for negotiations to take 
place, but the Russian response did not allow for flexibility in negotiation; their rejoinder 
was always that the Chechens must disarm and surrender. It was during this period that 
Russian journalist, Pavel Felgenhauer, reported that Russian Commanders believed the 
Chechens would not be able to continue operations without support from abroad. 
Illustrative of this, Chechen forces encountered growing food shortages and dwindling 
weapons and supplies, which shifted Chechen tactics from confrontations with the 
Russians to attacks within enemy-controlled territory. Russian tactics also changed to 
reflect a “scorched earth” policy wherein the nature of the conflict shifted from that of a 
disarmament campaign to what amounted to genocide. Chechen desperation was 
demonstrated during a statement by President Dudajev that openly threatened a transfer of 
the war to the cities of Russia, foreshadowing future escalatory terrorist modes of 
violence.78 
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Worsening Russian tactics, dwindling Chechen weapons and supplies, and 
retaliation for the deaths of civilians in village raids were likely what precipitated the 
movement of Chechen commander Shamil Basayev and his fighters into Budionovsk.79 
The terrorist operation in Budionovsk was carried out with approximately 70 fighters, who 
used grenade launchers and automatic weapons to hold close to 2000 people hostage at the 
local hospital. Basayev demanded that Russian federal troops withdraw from Chechnya in 
exchange for the release of the prisoners. Before this attack, negotiations for the cessation 
of hostilities in Chechnya was being conducted by Russian delegates who arguably viewed 
a settlement as a lower priority item. However, once the hostages were taken and attempts 
to recover them by Russian military failed, Prime Minister Chernomydrin entered the 
negotiations. Five days after the attack, the Prime Minister had agreed to cease Russian 
military action in Chechnya, open negotiations and grant amnesty to Basayev and his 
forces.80 This was a low-cost technology attack that had strategic implications for the 
conflict. 
While Shamil Basayev’s surprise attack on the Russian city of Budionovsk in June 
1995 acted as an impetus to bring the Chechens and the Russians to the negotiating table, 
the military accord that they signed had begun to disintegrate by late 1995.81 This 
disintegration was aggravated by Chechen commander Salman Raduev’s hostage-taking 
attack on the Dagestan village of Kizlar in retaliation for the Russian operations against 
Chechen villages, and a subsequent military confrontation on the border that caused the 
deaths of both hostages and Russian military members and allowed most of the Chechen 
forces to escape. This was so humiliating for the Russians that82 President Yeltsin told 
reporters that Moscow would wipe out Chechen strongholds and further stated that, “mad 
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dogs must be shot.”83 The Kizlar attack also precipitated the seizure of a Turkish Ferry by 
an ethnic Abkhazian group in the Port of Trabazon as a sign of solidarity with Raduev’s 
forces, who were at that time encircled by the Russian military in the Russian village of 
Pervomayskaya. The hijackers, reportedly with links to the Chechen conflict, threatened to 
blow up the ferry unless the Russian army ended the siege on Raduev’s forces; passengers 
of the ferry were mostly Russian.84 Peace negotiations were further hampered by an 
attempted assassination on Russian commander of the Interior Ministry Troops, Anatoly 
Romanov, after which Russia put its participation in abeyance. In response, Chechen 
leadership also suspended their participation and requested international observers and 
United Nations troops before they would resume participation. Russia rejected this request 
and continued to refer to the Chechen conflict as an internal conflict.85  
To further complicate the situation, Russian-supported elections were held in 
Chechnya on December 17, 1995, which confirmed Moscow appointed President Doku 
Zavgaev.86 This effectively nullified effective negotiations with pro-Dudajev forces, 
further alienated the populace, and did nothing to address the escalating violence 
precipitated by Russian forces. Voter participation in the election was minimal, and the 
legitimacy of the election was questioned by both pro-Dudajev forces and Russian anti-
war figures. The Congress of the Chechen People consequently signed a decree which 
called the elections illegal. Russian bombing raids and an escalation of operations in 
Dudajev-controlled territory triggered further divisions in Moscow and the Russian 
Defense Ministry; they further incited Chechen military commanders and alienation of the 
Chechen populace.87 By early 1996, the Chechen war had become a major campaign issue 
for the Russian presidential elections, and opinion polls were indicative of a Russian 
populace that was opposed to the war in Chechnya despite the Russian government claim 
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that Chechnya was mostly under Russian and the Moscow-backed Chechen government’s 
control.88  
In part, to address the unpopularity of the war, Russia initiated a dual policy of 
high-level negotiations coupled with military actions that were intended to decimate 
separatist forces and shore up the authority of Zavgaev’s regime. The brutality of the 
assaults caused even the Moscow-backed Chechen government to protest the high civilian 
casualties. Members of the Russian Duma Defense Committee concluded in a report that 
the “so-called clean-up operations increased civilian casualties and the inflow of fresh 
volunteers to separatist units.”89 Further, they found that support for Zavgaev’s 
government was extremely low among the Chechens and that the morale of Russian troops 
was likewise low, so much so that none of the officers thought that the tactics being used 
would result in success against the separatists. This policy also resulted in several 
diplomatic maneuvers to include a visit to Chechnya by President Yeltsin, a press blackout 
and a Yeltsin initiated peace plan that would allow Russian troops to withdraw from areas 
without conflict, while operations against “bandit formations” would be allowed to 
continue.90 
On August 9, 1996, Chechen separatists attacked Grozny concurrently with attacks 
against two neighboring cities, Argun and Gudermes, this was an attempt to force the 
Russians back to the negotiating table and as stated by Aslan Maskhadov on Ekho Mosky 
radio to illustrate to “Russia and the world community…that the war is not over.”91 The 
swarming attacks resulted in the complete rout of Russian forces. Negotiations were 
conducted on August 18, 1996, between senior Russian and Chechen commanders, 
simultaneously; Russian helicopters began dropping leaflets over Grozny warning civilians 
to flee the city within 48 hours. Fighting began to intensify around Grozny with Russian 
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military commanders stating that they would continue to use force against the Chechens. 
On August 21, 1996, President Bill Clinton sent a letter to President Yeltsin asking him to 
reopen negotiations. Several other countries also expressed concern over the deteriorating 
situation. The following day, newly appointed Russian Secretary of Security Council 
Alexander Lebed began a round of negotiations which resulted in the Khasavyurt 
Accords.92 
C. 1996–1999 INTERWAR PERIOD 
The first war ended with the withdrawal of Russian forces and a tentative Chechen 
victory; however, the Chechens demonstrated an inability to govern themselves or care for 
their populace once the war concluded. Chechnya essentially became a lawless state made 
up of competing power blocs, minimal government control, a vulnerable populace, no jobs, 
economy or infrastructure. Exacerbating this situation was the radicalization of Islam and 
the unforeseen consequences of that radicalization.93 It is important to note that all 
evidence indicates that radicalization was a consequence vice a cause of the first Chechen 
war, this is indicative of the shifting dualist perspective of the movement.94 
While initial reactions to the Khasavyurt Accords were optimistic, there were 
several internal and external signs that were indicative of future fractures amongst the 
signatories of the agreement.95 Upon the election of Aslan Maskhadov as the new Chechen 
President with approximately 64.8% of the vote, President Yeltsin appointed a commission 
to create a power-sharing treaty with the Chechens. However, Maskhadov appointed a 
commission to negotiate inter-state relations. During the same timeframe, 300 members of 
former President Yanderbiev’s presidential guard gathered in Grozny to protest some of 
Maskhadov’s decisions, and on March 3, 1997, 3000 people attended a rally led by 
Yanderbiev and Chechen commander Salman Raduev where Raduev threatened to attack 
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Russian cities.96 Further aggravating these fractures were the competing interests among 
the different power blocs within Chechnya, particularly among those who had become 
radicalized or dependent upon Islamic funding during the first Chechen war. Many of the 
commanders began to believe that Wahhabism was a better ideology to ensure Chechen 
independence and a steady flow of cash and resources from Islamic supporters abroad. 
Further, the formation of an Islamic state in Chechnya was perceived to be a way to gain 
support and solidarity with other Islamic states.97  
The radicalization of Chechen leadership coupled with the lack of aid from Russia 
undermined President Maskhadov’s regime and allowed Islamic organizations to expand 
their influence within Chechnya. Russia’s implementation of a border blockade and troop 
movements further weakened Maskhadov’s credibility and arguably pushed him into an 
alliance with the more radical power blocs. This resulted in the imposition of Sharia law 
on February 3, 1999, and the creation of a Shura.98 This shift to Wahhabism allowed the 
Russians to put a purely radical vice a separatist face on the Chechen conflict, and arguably 
influenced the decision of Shamil Basayev and Omar ibn al-Khattab to invade and commit 
acts of terrorism in Dagestan in 1999. This was evidenced by Khattab’s oath to defend 
threatened Muslim groups around the world, and Basayev’s call for an invasion of 
Dagestan. Notably, Chechen President Maskhadov was opposed to the invasion, but most 
of the fighters supported Basayev and not the President.99 
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D. 1999–2009 RUSSIAN-CHECHEN WAR 
The second Russian-Chechen war began following two controversial events: the 
attacks in Dagestan by the Islamic International Brigade in support of the Shura of 
Dagestan, and the Moscow apartment bombings.100 In an almost classic case of 
provocation,101 the Chechens believed that they could support the Dagestanis who wanted 
to secede, arm, train and equip them, they also believed they could cause some sort 
overreaction by authorities that required Chechen support, and then spin the conflict in the 
media in such a way as to gain support against the Russians. Unfortunately, for the 
Chechens, they misunderstood the Dagestani populace and failed to secure their support 
before invading. This resulted in the mobilization of local authorities and the eventual 
defeat of the invasion by the Russians. At this same time, several suspicious apartment 
bombings in Russia were blamed on the Chechen separatists, though notably never claimed 
by them nor proven to have been conducted by them. These two factors gave the Russians 
the justification they needed to invade Chechnya; President Maskhadov and the disparate 
Chechen power blocs perceived the invasion as a violation of the Khasavyurt Accord and 
thus began the second Russian-Chechen war.102 
When the Russians invaded Chechnya for the second time, they came prepared with 
better logistics and training, as well as overwhelming firepower; the Chechens on the other 
hand, had the weapons that were left over from the previous war and very little 
ammunition.103 Further, Prime Minister Putin’s campaign did not distinguish between the 
moderate separatists and terrorists. The initial target of this was President Maskhadov, 
whose requests for meetings were repeatedly refused and his envoy placed in jail. Vladimir 
Putin (then in charge of the Russian response) went so far as to state that Maskhadov was 
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not the legitimate president. Russian media precipitated the anti-Chechen hatred and 
depicted the conflict as a dualist one of “us vs. them.”104 Making matters worse, the 
Chechens intended to fight the Russians the same way that they had fought the first war, 
only this time they had no reliable source of weapons or ammunition besides what they 
could build themselves.105 Thus began what essentially became a guerilla war that could 
be broken out into four phases following the capture of Grozny by the Russians in February 
2000: Bez Predel (No Limits) from February 2000–May 2002; Basayev’s War (Terrorism) 
from May 2002–October 2005; Latency from October 2006–December 2007; and the 
Caucasus Emirate Phase.106 This thesis will focus on the first three phases of the conflict 
and bracket off the last as the Caucasus Emirate’s evolution into the Islamic State affiliate 
Vilayat Kavkaz is outside of the scope and intention of this paper.  
During the Bez Predel phase of the war, the Chechens focused primarily on 
targeting legitimate military and government targets, and conflict was still clearly intended 
to be a guerilla war against the Russian government. However, continued punitive tactics 
by the Russians influenced the strategies of the Chechens until suicide bombs (a method 
of low-cost technology attacks) vice “attack and retreat” tactics became the norm. This was 
a period that saw the introduction of black widows into the fight and an average of ten 
suicide attacks per month. Further, the continued predations by Russian forces upon the 
Chechen people underwrote the insurgency.107 September 11, 2001 reinforced Russian 
policies in Chechnya and allowed the Russians to alienate the moderate separatists from 
the international community and empowered the radicals.108 By the end of 2001, a reported 
3220 Russian military members had been killed, with 9,000 wounded; even more Chechen 
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fighters were reported as casualties, and approximately 100,000 refugees had fled 
Chechnya.109 
It was in late 2002 / early 2003 that the Chechen separatists seemed to become 
aware that they had lost the support of the international community, and their focus became 
the Russian national will.110 Contrary to earlier tactics, which had been a mix of terrorist, 
guerilla and conventional activities, this period of the conflict was primarily one of low-
cost technology terror attacks. The separatists made a critical miscalculation in that they 
assumed eventually that one of their attacks would be big enough to force the Russians to 
the table. This miscalculation was a layover from the first Chechen war when the 
Budionovsk attack resulted in demands being met, and negotiations renewed. The 
separatists did not realize the depth of their mistake until the Beslan School Siege that 
began on September 1, 2004. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Russian 
schoolchildren, yet still Russia refused to negotiate. It was arguably this response coupled 
with the continued support of the Russian populace for their government that drove the 
separatists into temporary latency. The number of terrorist and insurgent attacks decreased 
exponentially after the Beslan School Siege and the separatist movement seemingly 
underwent an identity crisis until the announcement of the Caucasus Emirate in October 
2007.111 
E. WHAT DROVE THE MODE OF VIOLENCE? 
The Chechen Separatists evolved from a conventional military to an insurgency and 
finally to what essentially became a terrorist organization. This shift was precipitated by 
their changing strategies and audience needs and was manifested by their increasingly 
brutal use of low-cost technology modes of violence and various plots to obtain nuclear 
technology. Of the two independent variables, goals and audience, only the audience 
variable changed throughout the conflict however that was likely sufficient to impact the 
dependent variable and change the mode of violence that was selected.  
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During the first Russo-Chechen War the separatists transitioned from a 
conventional force to one that successfully leveraged large-scale terrorism as a strategic 
asset. Their signaling needs were heavily impacted throughout the war by dwindling 
resources, an increasingly brutal enemy and a desperate need to bring the Russian’s back 
to the negotiating table. Further audience elements included the support of their domestic 
constituency, a war-weary enemy population, a fractured enemy government, international 
sympathy, and a unity of purpose. During the first and second phases of the war, the 
Chechens were facing an enemy with superior resources that was ill prepared for combat 
operations, and, because of this, they were able to maintain a primary strategy of attrition 
using low-level technologies and innovations. However, the third phase of the war 
introduced an increasingly brutal and better-resourced enemy, dwindling weaponry, 
radicalization and an assumption that attacks such as Budionovsk would provide much 
needed influence and negotiating power over the Russian government and populace. These 
factors arguably shifted the overarching strategy of the separatists from one of attrition to 
one of intimidation and outbidding,112 which precipitated the group’s increasingly 
destructive use of low-cost technologies and various plots to gain access to high-cost 
technologies.  
While there are numerous examples wherein the Chechens attempted to gain high-
cost technologies to affect their stratagem, one of the most chilling was the story told to a 
reporter about a radioactive parcel buried in a Moscow park. According to Shamil Basayev, 
this parcel was one of four radioactive packages that he and his followers had smuggled 
into Russia. Basayev stated that, “Today the war seems to many people to be over, nothing 
is really over. Now the war has become like a slow fuse or a trip wire. It doesn’t look like 
it’s burning on the outside, but a small event can trigger a big explosion.”113 A further 
illustration of this mentality was a plan annotated in President Dudayev’s archive to send 
Slavic-looking fighters to capture a Russian atomic submarine in 1995 or 1996 to coerce 
Moscow into withdrawing troops. Dudayev’s archive also had plans detailing plots to blow 
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up nuclear power facilities, military airfields and oil refineries.114 That said, it is 
particularly interesting to note that, once the separatists realized that their more destructive 
low-cost technology attacks were essentially failures in that they were not furthering the 
Chechen end state, such attacks dropped exponentially.115 
During the second Russo-Chechen War the separatists became increasingly 
desperate to affect their end-state which had become an increasingly unpragmatic goal. 
Their signaling needs were evidenced by the increased destructiveness of their modes of 
violence to amplify the signal they were attempting to send. Further audience needs 
included competing power blocs, a war-weary Chechen populace, a united Russian 
population and government, and a less sympathetic international community. This was a 
significant change to the independent variable of audience and precipitated an increased 
use of destructive low-cost technology modes of violence against civilian targets to affect 
their goal, which, despite claims to the contrary remained that of the right to self-
determination and secession.116  
The supposition that high cost or emerging technologies may not be the right tools 
to affect the strategies of disparate VNSAs brings us back full circle to the question of 
whether VNSAs reach for technology merely because it is available. Based upon the study 
of the modes of violence used by the Chechen separatists in this thesis, the shift was 
predicated upon their need to increase their signaling to affect their audience and 
accomplish their goals. What is perhaps most notable about the Chechen case is that there 
was minimal outcry on the part of the civilian constituency of the separatists against the 
modes of violence used against Russian civilians; perhaps due to the depredations of the 
Russian military during both conflicts and the failure of the Russian government to redress 
those depredations.  
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III. CHRISTIAN IDENTITY 
The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSAL) was a group that 
evolved from a small Christian community to a group that was charged with sedition 
against the United States government. They were selected for this study because of their 
evolutionary path from a peaceful non-state community to one that participated in activities 
and modes of violence intended to destabilize the government. However, unpragmatic that 
goal may have been. Their shifting strategies and audience needs impacted them to the 
degree that they began a series of low-cost technology modes of violence against a variety 
of civilian and government targets, though their modes of violence remained on the lower 
end of the destructive scale. The intent of the following case study is to present a narrative 
that includes the groups belief system and their evolutionary pathway while focusing on 
the two independent variables (shifting goals and audience needs) and how they affect the 
dependent variable (mode of violence chosen).  
A. CHRISTIAN IDENTITY: POLITICS AND POPULACE 
Christian Identity, hereafter referred to as Identity, is a belief system whose 
adherents comprise disparate independent churches, Bible study groups, political 
organizations and communal settlements throughout the United States.117 The core beliefs 
of this organization are that white, Aryan people are direct descendants of the tribes of 
Israel, that the Jewish people are biological descendants of Eve and Satan (two seed-line 
theory), and that the Last Days are soon to begin. It is hard to identify the size of the 
movement, since the groups that subscribe to the Identity ideology range from the Ku Klux 
Klan to certain Posse Comitatus groups. Further, many members belong to small churches 
throughout rural American and live quiet and law-abiding lives.118 Illustrative of this are 
                                                 
117 Stephen E. Atkins, Encyclopedia of Right Wing Extremism in Modern American History (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO LLC, 2011), 133–134. 
118 Michael Barkun, “Millenarians and Violence: The Case of the Christian Identity Movement,” in 
Millennium, Messiahs and Mayhem, ed. Thomas Robbins and Susan J. Palmer (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1997), 247–249; Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right (Chapel Hill, and London: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997) 158–191; Atkins, Encyclopedia of Right Wing Extremism in 
Modern American History, 133–140. 
36 
the Identity communities in LaPorte, Colorado; Schell City, Missouri; and Elohim City, 
Oklahoma.119 That said, there are those who believe that the Identity belief system justifies 
violence against the enemies of God to include minorities and most government entities 
above the local level.120 
Notably, the seminal document of the Christian Identity movement is a novel called 
the Turner Diaries.121 This book depicts a group called “The Order” who uses terrorism 
as a strategy against the United States after the confiscation of privately owned weapons. 
Their terrorist strategy involves the targeted killing of Jews, minorities and government 
officials, the poisoning of water supplies, economic sabotage and the use of a truck bomb 
to decimate the FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. The turning point in the novel is 
when the group seizes Vandenberg Air Force Base and takes over their nuclear missiles 
and warheads, then launches them and eradicates several American cities. Ultimately, a 
race war is initiated through this use of terrorism, and all non-whites are exterminated.122 
Those that believe in Identity are post-tribulationist, which means that they believe 
that the tribulation will be a race war in which nonwhite people will attack and seek to 
destroy the white population and that the Antichrist will be a Jew.123 Though Identity 
ministers do not necessarily advocate violence for the sake of violence, their belief in the 
distinction between God’s laws and those of man’s allow individual groups under the 
umbrella of Identity to justify the use of violence based on prejudice.124 As stated by Bruce 
Hoffman, Identity group’s violent adherents are very similar to other religious extremist 
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groups like Islamic Sunni and Shi’a extremists in that they turn intangible political ideas 
and objectives into religious requirements. Further, like jihadist groups, many Identity 
adherents see themselves as being involved in an ongoing and existential battle against evil 
and, as such, do not recognize innocents.125 Illustrative of this are the approximately three 
dozen violent acts and plots by groups affiliated with Christian Identity since the Oklahoma 
City bombing in 1995.126 Some examples include plots to blow up natural gas processing 
plants, poison water supplies, and a raid in Tyler, Texas that recovered a cache of sodium 
cyanide, suitcase bombs, half a million rounds of ammunition and sixty pipe bombs.127 
However, perhaps the most well known example of a Christian Identity group that chose 
violence is the CSAL.128  
B. THE COVENANT, THE SWORD AND THE ARM OF THE LORD 
Zarephath-Horeb, later renamed the CSAL, was founded in the 1970s by James 
Ellison as a community for spiritual growth and where Christians could “dwell safely away 
from the government of the Antichrist.”129 The group settled upon a remote 220-acre farm 
in Northern Arkansas.130 They were a post tribulationist group who initially believed that 
their mission was to feed and care for the Christians who would come to them during the 
tribulation. In order to accomplish this mission, the group believed that they not only 
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needed rural housing and enough supplies to support themselves, but they would also need 
to prepare militarily to defend themselves against the predators who would become 
prevalent once the end times arrived. They believed that approximately 90% of the 
population would die soon after the tribulation began and that they, the elect, would 
precipitate the rule of Christ.131 In the late 1970s the group purchased $52,000 worth of 
weapons, equipment and training.132 Despite this, the group remained a small non-violent 
survivalist group until their introduction to Christian Identity in late 1979.133 
On April 7, 1988 an Arkansas jury consisting of all white members acquitted key 
members of the nation’s largest white supremacist organizations, including the Aryan 
Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, CSAL and the Order, of all charges of conspiring to take over 
the federal government and assassinate a federal judge and a federal agent. The prosecution 
stated that the accused had previously met with the intent incite a rebellion against the 
United States government and begin an all-white nation in the Pacific Northwest.134 
Among the items recovered from the CSAL compound was “a 30-gallon drum of cyanide, 
numerous automatic assault rifles, a fully operational LAW guided rocket a Lewis machine 
gun, handguns, rifles, C-4 explosives, land mines, hand grenades and thousands of rounds 
of ammunition.”135 How did a small commune of fundamental Christians become an active 
participant in a plot to the overthrow the United States government using modes of violence 
that were foreshadowed by the Turner Diaries? 
By late 1979 the group had become more convinced of the need to defend 
themselves against predation. They began participating in a “military day” every Sunday, 
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where they practiced maneuvers, drills and swore to serve their military commanders, 
God’s army and to shoot any traitors or deserters in the back. Additionally, they began 
converting their weapons to fully automatic and building homemade silencers and 
grenades,136 presumably in the factories on their compound, which they used to produce 
weapons for group use and for sale to other groups and individuals.137 This environment 
was fertile ground for the introduction of an ideology that enhanced their belief in the 
impending apocalypse. It was into this environment that James Ellison presented sermons 
from a well-known Identity preacher named Dan Gayman. This coupled with their 
exposure to the patriotic, tax protesting ideology of the Christian-Patriots Defense League, 
solidified their changing goals and emerging dualist thinking. Reflective of this, they 
invested in and converted additional weapons and built an obstacle course and mock four-
block town to practice urban warfare. An additional sign of the group’s devolution was 
their participation in insurance fraud by assisting James Ellison’s sister to burn down her 
trailer house. They justified this as an act in the war against the Beast (two “demons” 
associated with Lucifer in the biblical book of Revelations), who in the minds of the group 
was now synonymous with the United States government.138  
During a visit to the Christian Patriot’s Defense League in January 1981, James 
Ellison preached that the group was preparing for war against the American government; 
shortly thereafter the group decided that the name Zarephath-Horeb was too complicated 
for the public, and that they needed a name that would be representative of their 
paramilitary mission.139 It was decided that “the Covenant” spoke of the covenants that 
God had made with the group and those that they had made to one another; “the Sword” 
spoke of the God’s coming judgment upon America; and “the Arm” was representative of 
the people whom God would use to direct that judgment. In addition to their name change, 
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the group also began publishing a monthly newsletter highlighting Identity teachings, 
survivalism, military tradecraft, and right-wing rhetoric.140 
It was during this period that the group initiated measures that would allow them to 
escalate their ability to conduct violent acts while making a name for themselves amongst 
other right-wing and Identity groups. They bought a 30-gallon barrel of cyanide reportedly 
so they could poison water supply systems in major cities. They also had one of their 
munition’s personnel place some of the cyanide into the sealed tips of their hollow-point 
bullets. There were internal plans to blow up area dams and take control of the counties 
surrounding the compound. They also began offering survival training at their “End Time 
Overcomer Survival School,” where attendees paid a fee of $500 and reportedly learned 
urban and rural warfare.141 With this, the group arguably solidified their belief that they 
were both the armorer and the trainer for the militant of Identity and the right wing.142 
Illustrative of this, CSAL began publishing statements and declarations to reflect 
what they saw as their purpose in the fight against “evil.” The first of which was a statement 
that told of a prophecy received by a group member which stated that “he would establish 
our name across the United States, to be a Beacon of Light.” They also published their 
“Declaration of Non-Surrender,” which stated, “we accept the principle that it is better to 
stand, and if need be fall for the cause of Christ and Country than to submit to the coming 
attempt of satanic and socialistic world order.”143 What made CSAL stand out from other 
Identity groups at the time was that Ellison was radical in his beliefs, and there was no one 
within his group who would curb his more violent impulses as long as they remained 
consistent with the group’s narrative.144 The CSAL’s belief in its ability to act and effect 
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their goals spawned the idea for the CSAL National Convocation in October 1982. 
Attendees included members from the Aryan Nation, Christian-Patriots Defense League, 
the Klan, and Robert Millar, founder of Elohim City.145 
Shortly after the 1982 National Convocation, approximately two-thirds of the core 
group departed the compound due to Ellison’s desire to take a second wife; this coupled 
with the death of Gordon Kahl arguably acted as the impetus to the group’s escalation from 
violent rhetoric to violent acts.146 Federal and local law enforcement were sent to arrest 
Posse Comitatus member Gordon Kahl in February 1983 for probation violations; this 
attempt resulted in a shoot-out where Kahl’s son and two U.S. marshals were killed. Kahl 
fled and ended up hiding in Arkansas with affiliates of CSAL, where he was subsequently 
killed by law enforcement on June 3, 1983.147 The group saw this as a sign from God that 
they should retaliate; further, since this had happened near their compound, they felt that 
they had to act or lose all credibility. Complicating matters further was the outcry from the 
various Identity and right-wing organizations calling Kahl’s death a heroic struggle and 
asking CSAL what they intended to do about it.148 
In part to maintain the credibility of the CSAL, Ellison traveled to the Aryan Nation 
Annual Congress in Hayden Lake, Idaho, and stated that, “for every one of our people they 
kill, we ought to kill one hundred of theirs!”149 Plans were reportedly discussed to finance 
the movement through illicit acts. A list was drawn up detailing those that needed to be 
killed. Perhaps more concerning was the Aryan points system that was drawn up where 
points would be awarded to those who committed illegal acts; stealing would be worth a 
                                                 
145 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City, 109–112. 
146 Kaplan, “The Roots of Religious Violence in America,” 486–487; Noble, 117–123. 
147 “History – No Greater Tragedy – February 13, 1983,” U.S. Marshals Service, February 13, 1983, 
https://www.usmarshals.gov/history/muir-cheshire/kahl.html; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate: Why They 
Bombed Oklahoma City, 129–13; Frank Rajkowski, “Flashback Friday: Manhunt for Gordon Kahl Ended 
in Bloody Shootout 35 Years Ago,” KSTP News, last modified June 01, 2018, https://kstp.com/news/
flashback-friday-manhunt-for-gordon-kahl-ended-in-bloody-shootout-35-years-ago-us-marshals-medina-
north-dakota-posse-comitatus/4931110/. 
148 Noble, 130–131. 
149 Noble, 130–131. 
 
42 
point, killing a minority would be worth five points, and so on.150 The attendees also 
discussed Louis Beam’s idea of “leaderless resistance”151 wherein independent cells that 
they referred to as “silent warriors” would be created to commit acts of violence without 
coordination and communication with other cells.152 When Ellison was asked what types 
of attacks they would conduct, he responded by stating: “dumping cyanide into the 
reservoirs of major cities, killing federal agents, blowing up an ADL building or overpasses 
in major cities; maybe even blowing up a federal building.”153 Notably, it was the Hayden 
Lake meeting in 1983 that the prosecution for the Fort Smith Sedition Trial pinpointed as 
the beginning of the conspiracy to overthrow the government.154  
CSAL subsequently prepared a document that declared “War in ‘84” that was 
entitled ATTACK–Aryan Tactical Treaty for the Advancement of Christ’s Kingdom, the 
group envisioned 1984 as the year of the Second American Revolution with themselves as 
a part of the new founding fathers.155 The declaration indicated the group’s intent to meet 
any government force with equal if not greater force. The group’s initial acts were all low-
cost technology modes of violence and included the pouring of gasoline through the front 
mail slot of a church that had gay members, the bombing of a Jewish Community Center, 
the taping of a large amount of dynamite to a natural gas pipeline, and the robbery and 
murder of a pawnshop owner. Except for the murder, none of these attacks resulted in 
major damage to property or people.156  
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These low-cost technology modes of violence were all perceived to be incremental 
steps to a greater goal; As Ellison stated: “we need something with a large body count to 
make the government sit up and take notice.”157 That attention-getting attack was 
identified as the Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City. After conducting 
reconnaissance on the building, Ellison instructed the group’s munitions expert, a prior 
Green Beret, to build a rocket system that could destroy the building. Despite the low-cost 
technology manner of the attack, CSAL members estimated that approximately 500 men, 
women, and children would die in the attack. Which would have made it the largest 
domestic terrorist attack ever conducted in the United States at that time. Fortuitously, 
during testing, a rocket exploded in the munitions expert’s hands. This was taken as a sign 
from God that the attack should not go forth.158 
It was during the Second National Convocation in November of 1983 that two 
things of note occurred: James Ellison was proclaimed “King James of the Ozarks” by 
Elohim Cities Richard Millar and Ellison and his deputies decided that the war would begin 
on December 26, 1983.159 The initial plan consisted of a plot to assassinate federal Judge 
Waters, federal prosecutor Asa Hutchinson, and FBI agent Jack Knox in retribution for the 
death of Gordon Kahl. Ellison notified both Richard Butler of the Aryan Nations and 
Robert Miles of Mountain Kirk, a Klan affiliate, of his plans. However, on their way to 
carry out the targeted assassinations, members of the group were in a head-on collision. 
Ellison took this as a sign that the mission should be aborted. This created censure from 
the right-wing movement and a degradation in the credibility of the group. Another failed 
plot occurred when CSAL member Kerry Noble aborted an attempt to blow up a gay church 
with a briefcase containing C4 explosives and dynamite. While sitting inside during the 
service, he stated that while he knew the attempt would be successful, he also knew that it 
would not start the revolution they wanted.160 
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By mid-to-late 1984 a combination of money and legal issues ratcheted up the 
pressure on CSAL and ultimately resulted in a three-day siege on the CSAL compound.161 
On June 30, 1984, a CSAL member, Richard Wayne Snell, was pulled over in DeQueen, 
Arkansas, by an African American police officer whom he subsequently shot and killed. 
Snell fled but was caught at a roadblock in Broken Bow, Oklahoma. Several weapons in 
his vehicle were tied to CSAL and Ellison. In July of 1984, the group’s munitions expert, 
Kent Yates, was arrested on a federal weapons violation. Finally, on April 15, 1985, the 
anti-paramilitary provision was signed into law by Governor Bill Clinton.162 On April 21, 
1985, law enforcement officers surrounded the compound with a search warrant, and on 
April 22, 1985, Ellison surrendered without incident.163 
In August of 1986, both James Ellison and Kerry Noble agreed to testify against 14 
other right-wing members in what became the Fort Smith Sedition Trial.164 On April 27, 
1987, 14 individuals were charged “with seditious conspiracy, interstate transportation of 
stolen property, receipt of stolen money and conspiracy to murder federal officials.” 
Supporting the indictment were 130 overt acts of travel and meetings about the overthrow 
of “the government, homicide, sale, and purchase of automatic weapons, armed robbery” 
that resulted in more than $4 million and the subsequent dispersal of the money, all 
members were acquitted.165 
C. WHAT DROVE THE MODE OF VIOLENCE? 
CSAL is a group that evolved from a peaceful religious group to one that plotted to 
overthrow the United States government and its strategies, influence needs and modes of 
violence shifted accordingly. This shift was precipitated by their changing goals and 
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audience needs and illustrated by their choice to adopt low-cost technology modes of 
violence. Of the two independent variables, goals and audience, both the goal of the group 
and their audience needs evolved and impacted the dependent variable.  
CSAL was a relatively peaceful group that transitioned to declaring war against the 
United Stated government.166 CSAL’s signaling needs were heavily impacted by the need 
to maintain credibility and influence needs over its core constituency and other right wing 
extremist and Identity organizations. At the outset the group had a dedicated closed 
constituency who considered the “enemy” to be the unknown predators that would 
unfailingly threaten them after the tribulation period began. This was consistent with its 
goal to maintain the status quo of the group, and the integrity of the compound. Once the 
group accepted the Identity ideology, its constituency, its enemy and the goal of the 
organization began to shift. The goal became regime change and to some extent social 
control. The constituency became an open system wherein CSAL needed to maintain 
credibility and influence over both the inner and outer constituencies. Further, the strategy 
became a mix of provocation and intimidation.167 This was illustrated initially by the name 
change, publication of various statements and prophecy, and the group’s perception of 
itself as the armorer and trainer of the Identity and right-wing movements. However, this 
shift was most notable once they decided to escalate to active rather than preventative 
modes of violence. 
Once the schism within the group occurred, the group lost its ability to temper 
Ellison’s more violent impulses. Further, the group’s need to maintain a positive image 
amongst Identity and right-wing groups arguably acted as a forcing mechanism which 
resulted in the group’s initial participation in low-cost technology modes of violence as a 
means of signaling to their disparate audiences their intent to affect their goals. As early as 
1981, the group had been preparing for war against the government, but it was the demand 
signal from the outer constituency following Kahl’s death that caused the group to shift 
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their activities from petty crime to acts of terror. Perhaps more interesting, however, is the 
fact that it was the group’s inner constituency and narrative which prevented them from 
escalating to more destructive low-cost technology modes of violence. Specifically, the 
Murrah building attack. Which did not take place because the inner constituency believed 
that the accident with the rocket was a sign that the attack should not take place. Further, 
the plan to conduct targeted assassinations of government officials was also aborted 
because the inner constituency believed that the head-on collision was a sign from God that 
the attack should not go forward. Perhaps not surprisingly, the influence needs of the inner 
constituency trumped those of the outer constituency.  
In contrast to the Russo-Chechen case, the enemy populace and government 
seemed to play a lesser role in the story of CSAL. However, that may not be the case with 
all Identity and right-wing groups. In at least one instance, that of the Aryan Nations, the 
Fort Smith Sedition Trial scared Richard Butler to the point that he distanced his group 
from any direct action and limited them to recruitment and propaganda.168 Interestingly, 
later suppositions posit that though the Fort Smith Sedition Trial may have driven some 
groups away from explicit acts of violence, others played a part in a network of Patriot and 
Identity insurgents who assisted Timothy McVeigh in carrying out the bombing of the 
Murrah Federal Building in 1995. Whether suppositions of a network of insurgents 
assisting McVeigh is true or not, what they failed to account for was the reaction of the 
American populace. Far from inciting a revolution against the government, the attack had 
a detrimental effect on the movement as a whole; from 1996 to 2000 active Identity and 
right-wing groups dropped from 858 to 194.169  
Interestingly, CSAL limited themselves to low-cost technology modes of violence 
despite their access and stated willingness to use cyanide. Further, they limited themselves 
to low-cost technology attacks on the lower end of the destruction scale when they had the 
opportunity and the means to carry out what would have amounted to the largest acts of 
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domestic terror in United States history at the time. This finding is relevant to the question 
of whether VNSAs reach for technology merely because it is available. Based upon the 
study of the modes of violence by CSAL, it is probable that these entities reached for the 
modes of violence that would allow them to maintain credibility with their constituency 
but that their lack of belief in their own narrative coupled with the lack of an existential 
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IV. AUM SHINRIKYO 
Aum Shinrikyo was an organization that began as a yoga and meditation group and 
ended as the first known violent non-state actor to use a weapon of mass destruction.170 
Aum was chosen for this study because of their evolutionary path from a peaceful 
progressive millenarianism perspective to that of a dualist catastrophic millenarianism 
stance, their targeting of civilians and the limited constraints under which they operated. It 
is important to note that Aum Shinrikyo’s overarching objective was never destruction for 
the sake of destruction.171 The group’s evolutionary pathway was characterized by a 
growing hostility toward it by the Japanese public and government and a corresponding 
shift towards a dualist and catastrophic millenarian perspective by the group.172 This 
transition was driven by the groups changing strategy and audience needs from their 
inception to their ending. Furthermore, it was a result of their changing internal strategy 
and narrative, constituency, and their shifting perception of the “outside” world that 
resulted in their swing from proselytization to violence.173 As this shift occurred, the group 
attempted to adopt increasingly destructive modes of violence. The intent of the following 
case study is present a narrative focusing on the evolution of Aum’s goals and audience 
needs followed by an analysis on how the two independent variables (goals and audience 
needs) effected the dependent variable (mode of violence chosen).  
A. AUM SHINRIKYO: POLITICS, POPULATION AND STRATEGY 
1. Early Years of Aum Shinrikyo: 1984–1988 
Shoko Asahara’s (then named Chizuo Matsumoto) group Aum Shinsen no Kai was 
established (but not formally recognized) as a religion in 1986. The group’s original 
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purpose was the spiritual awakening of its members, who were taught to excise bad karma 
and other impediments that were perceived by the group to be inherent to living within the 
modern and materialistic Japanese society.174 This original goal began to change following 
a vision that Asahara received in 1985 that designated him as the Abiraketsu no Mikoto or 
“the god who leads the armies of the gods.”175 In this vision, he was given the task of 
creating the Buddhist paradise of Shambhala. He was to transform first Japan and then the 
world.176 Shortly after that, he had a vision which convinced him that only a chosen few 
would survive the apocalypse and Japan was facing imminent destruction. Further, he was 
Japans only means of survival.177 
Despite the apocalyptic nature of his visions, Matsumoto believed that spiritual 
action could save the world. The group merely needed to grow large enough to create the 
positive energy needed to mitigate the negative karma inherent within the world. To do 
this, the group would need to open centers all over the world and gain 30,000 adherents 
who would renounce the world to live in the group’s communes which would become the 
foundation for the future civilization. Chizuo Matsumoto soon renamed himself Shoko 
Asahara, and with approximately 13 followers he opened the group’s first office to begin 
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proselytization.178 The group changed its name to Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) in 
1987.179
A central tenet of Aum Shinrikyo was the renunciation of the world in favor of 
living within the communes, called becoming shukkesha.180 It is important to note that 
renouncing the world meant cutting ties with the outside world, giving all possessions to 
the group and signing an agreement to strive for freedom through asceticism and absolving 
Aum of the blame should anything happen to after renunciation. The movement’s rapid 
expansion from 35 members in 1986 to 1300 members by 1987 opened them up to their 
first negative media criticism from the families of members who had renounced the world. 
Renunciation was to become a large source of conflict between Aum and the outside world 
and would eventually propel them into their first overt external acts of violence.181 
2. The Radicalization of Aum Shinrikyo: 1988–1992
Many of Aum Shinrikyo’s tenets were derived from Tibetan Buddhism and were 
used by Asahara to build a foundation for the movement that ultimately legitimated the 
internal and external violence that came to characterize the group. That said, two central 
beliefs acted as the main foci of this legitimation, poa and the accumulation of karma. Poa 
means that those who die can be assisted in obtaining a better rebirth through the 
intercession of a more advanced spiritual figure. Asahara’s interpretation became a little 
more sinister. He came to believe the people’s deaths were justified if they were killed in 
order to prevent them from living a bad life.182 Also, he initially believed that, in order to 
attain higher states of being, individuals needed to ascend based upon the Mahayana 
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disciplines of Buddhism: 1. Offerings, 2. Observance of Buddhist Precepts, 3. Patience and 
fortitude, 4. Devotion 5. Meditation, and 6. The cultivation of wisdom. This necessitated 
and stimulated detachment.183 Throughout this period the tenets of Aum Shinrikyo became 
more demanding of its members and increasingly dualist, this was illustrated in their use 
of violence and their perceived rejection from Japanese society during this period.  
Asahara believed that the coercion of group members to make them perform 
austerities was essential to their continued spiritual growth.184 This was perceived as a 
compassionate act to help lesser spiritual beings reach greater heights in their growth. In 
late 1988 one of these sessions involving forced cold water immersion resulted in the death 
of one of Aum’s devotees, this was particularly problematic because the group planned on 
applying for legal recognition as a religious group in 1989. The death was covered up. 
However, one of the devotees involved in the death subsequently wanted to leave the group 
and, fearing that he would report the incident, Asahara ordered him killed.185 Almost 
simultaneously, Asahara’s teachings regarding poa began to shift from the traditional 
Buddhist interpretation to what would later justify additional murders and eventually mass 
destruction as an act of salvation.186  
Aum Shinrikyo’s initial application for legal, religious recognition was rejected due 
to continued community concerns about shukkesha which manifested themselves in a series 
of negative media stories and an anti-Aum group that was named Oumu Shinriyo higaisha 
no kai (Aum Shinrikyo’s Victims’ Society). Notably, the victim’s society retained a lawyer 
named Sakamoto Tsutsumi as its representative.187 Aum devotees later murdered 
Sakamoto, his wife, and their fourteen-month-old son following a series of negative media 
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reports regarding Sakamoto’s case against Aum Shinrikyo.188 Following the rejection of 
legal recognition, Asahara and Aum members filed an appeal and began a series of protests 
that ultimately resulted in a favorable verdict. It was during this period that Asahara began 
to preach about the conflict between Aum and the civil authorities and that he decided that 
Aum needed to accumulate a more solid power base. Asahara told his followers that 
proselytization would not be adequate to convert enough faithful to establish Shambhala. 
They needed political authority as well.189 
Aum Shinrikyo established the Shinri political party to participate in the February 
1990 Japanese parliamentary elections, the elections were a humiliating defeat and were 
arguably a turning point in Aum’s trajectory. The defeat of Aum was due in part to the 
continued negative press, the suspicions of the public regarding Aum’s involvement the 
murder of the Sakamoto family despite the lack of a police investigation and the oddness 
of Aum’s campaign.190 The election was also disastrous in the sense that defections from 
Aum became common and their public image became so bad that one scholar commented 
that making fun of Aum was a national pastime.191 Though timelines differ, Aum’s plan 
to begin experimenting with chemical and biological weapons began shortly after the 
disastrous election campaign.192 It is likely that Aum’s increasing catastrophic 
millennialist perspective was exacerbated by both the campaign and their failure to obtain 
the recruitment numbers of shukkesha needed to avert catastrophe. Notably, Asahara’s 
sermons following the election focused on the impending end of the world while stressing 
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that it would be almost impossible to save anyone outside of Aum as they were either a 
part of the conspiracy against Aum or complicit in it.193 
Asahara gave a three-day training seminar on the island of Ishigaki in April 1990 
for Aum members and potential shukkesha. There were three things of note that occurred 
during this period. An estimated 500 attendees decided to join Aum, and 200 decided to 
become shukkesha. Asahara also announced a shift from Mahayana Buddhism (world 
salvation) to Vajrayana Buddhism wherein only an elect few will be saved. Separately, 
many believe that there was an ulterior motive to remove Aum members from Tokyo. This 
is perhaps substantiated as while the seminar was taking place, several senior members of 
Aum attempted to conduct a biological attack in Tokyo. They used an aerosol device to 
spray botulism toxin around the parliament building and downtown Tokyo. An attempt to 
spread anthrax the following month also failed.194 These attempts were indicative of a 
paradigm shift in Aum’s mode of violence. Previously, their violence had been against 
individuals who threatened their mission now their enemies were those who were not 
Aum.195 
This dualist perspective was further substantiated by Aum’s ongoing conflicts with 
civil authorities and the locals surrounding the communes where the shukkesha lived.196 
Senior Aum leaders were arrested for law violations, and it was not abnormal for protests 
or mass fights to break out. It was common for communities to prevent the shukkesha from 
voting, getting utilities, or enrolling their kids in school. This was exacerbated by the fact 
that Aum members believed themselves to be superior to the unenlightened masses and 
played into the emerging dualist outlook of the group. Despite this, Aum invested mass 
amounts of resources in proselytizing and gaining overseas membership from 1991–1992. 
Notably, the only real success that Aum had was in Russia. They were able to recruit 
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approximately 30,000 members and several hundred shukkesha. However, it was in Russia 
where Aum first encountered the potential to gain military grade weapons. With Russia’s 
unregulated market, Aum now had a reliable avenue for arms acquisition.197 
3. The Escalation of Aum Shinrikyo: 1992–1995
The success of overseas recruitment was fleeting, and defections continued 
throughout the early 1990s challenging the foundations of the movement and necessitating 
the amplification of a perceived external threat to the group.198 This was reflected in 
Asahara’s sermons throughout 1993. The sermons pinpointed the United States as the chief 
evil in the apocalypse and that the Japanese would inevitably be conquered. This left Aum 
as the sole defender of good and truth. It was around this time that Aum ceased large-scale 
proselytization efforts and began to concentrate on arming itself.199 Asahara reportedly 
stated that “we need a lot of weapons to prevent Armageddon, and we must prepare them 
quickly.”200 
Interestingly there was also an emergence of a “science lobby” within Aum that 
arguably influenced the nature of the weapons Aum chose to adopt: modern technologies 
as well as advanced and destructive weapons.201 Between 1993 and 1995, Aum acquired 
a mix of both conventional and unconventional weapons that would rival most nation states 
and established what was fundamentally a shadow government structure complete with 
ministers. With this, the group effectively seceded from Japan and perceived themselves 
to be operating in opposition to it. They recruited both the technically proficient and 
scientists, to include two nuclear scientists to assist them.202  
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Aum reportedly received training from Russia’s KGB and Spetsnaz in clandestine 
warfare, martial arts, escape and evasion, and weaponry.203 They also acquired a Mi-17 
helicopter, were able to produce their own AK-47s, manufacture TNT, and either had or 
were in the process of acquiring VX, tabun, and soman nerve agents, mustard gas, sodium 
cyanide and anthrax, Q-fever and sarin. They also attempted to develop a nuclear 
capability. To facilitate this, the group bought acreage in Australia with the intent to mine 
uranium to send back to Japan where their scientists could convert it into weapons-grade 
material.204 Notably, memos seized from a senior member of Aum contained quoted prices 
for nuclear warheads as well as for the purchase of a property with uranium deposits.205 
In March 1994 Asahara began speaking of the necessity of “poaing” humanity for 
their own good, he also told his closest disciples that he had received a vision telling him 
that war was imminent. Further, only he could save those who could be saved, and they 
were subsequently free to operate without moral considerations.206 On June 27, 1994, the 
group conducted its first sarin attack which was self-described as an act of war by the new 
“nation.” The attack was aimed at three judges who were officiating a case against Aum as 
well as the general public. The police blamed a local farmer. It was not until November 
that the police confirmed that there was sarin present on the local Aum compound. Aum 
blamed their enemies, and the police did not investigate further until public outcry caused 
them to reconsider. This coupled with a very public abduction of a public notary by an 
Aum member acted as a further catalyst for the police. It became public knowledge that 
the police would raid Aum compounds around March 20, 1995. To prevent the raid with a 
preemptive strike, Asahara ordered a batch of sarin to be made to carry out the March 20, 
1995 subway attacks.207 This attack was not Aum’s last attempt, but it was effectively a 
death knell for the group.  
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B. WHAT DROVE THE MODE OF VIOLENCE? 
Aum Shinrikyo was a group that evolved from a meditation group to one that 
wanted power, whether political or otherwise. While their goal continues to be debated, 
there is a marked correlation between their shifting end-state, audience needs and modes 
of violence. The group’s choice to adopt high-cost technology modes of violence was 
precipitated by their shifting end-state and audience needs. Of the two independent 
variables, goals and audience, both the goal of the group and their audience needs evolved 
and impacted the dependent variable of mode of violence.  
Aum was a relatively peaceful group that transitioned to one that, in effect, seceded 
from Japan.208 Its signaling needs were heavily impacted first by the need to convert as 
many people as possible in order to save them and then by the need to poa them for their 
own good. At the outset Aum was a small group with a dedicated constituency and a belief 
that they could convert the rest. Its enemies were vague and distant. This was consistent 
with the goal to effect social control. Once the group failed to meet recruitment quota’s 
and began to become the negative focus of the public, both the constituency, the enemy, 
and the goal of the organization began to shift. Further, its constituency became more 
limited, while enemies became more defined. This was illustrated by the group’s rhetoric, 
escalating violence both internally and externally and the cessation of proselytizing efforts.  
Because the group was so hierarchical, there was no one to temper the violent 
impulses of its senior members. Further, many members of the group fervently believed 
and reinforced the emerging dualist perspective of Aum. While it is important to note that 
Aum was a very compartmented group and many of the lower members were not aware of 
the actions of those carrying out low and high-cost technology attacks, the group was such 
that individual members were honored to be asked to show their devoutness by carrying 
out such attacks.209 Asahara had always had an apocalyptic millenarian perspective and 
when his perspective shifted from progressive to catastrophic the group’s internal 
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constituency aided and supported him because the strategy, narrative, and goals that they 
supported were incrementally shifted to support the escalating modes of violence. Perhaps 
more interesting, however, is the fact that the Japanese police consistently failed to 
investigate or counter Aum’s actions due to a fear of infringing upon religious freedoms. 
Had they been investigated when the public demanded it after the Sakamoto murder, 
perhaps they would have been able to temper the group’s commitment to Asahara.  
Whether Aum’s goal was the overthrow of the Japanese government or the pure 
destruction of non-Aum members, the details show that the group’s low and high-cost 
technology attacks were reactive to their potential constituency, the enemy populace, and 
the enemy government. Regardless of whether outsiders can perceive the escalation as 
rational, their actions were consistent with their narrative and were perceived as rational 
action by them. Interestingly, it can be argued that it was the thwarting of Aum’s pursuit 
of power via acceptable means that pushed them towards escalating modes of violence.210 
Like the Russo-Chechen case and the CSAL case, once the enemy populace and 
government aligned against the group, their activities ceased, their leaders were 
imprisoned, and remaining adherents have stayed within the bounds of social constraints.  
In contrast to the Russo-Chechen and the CSAL cases, when given the choice Aum 
opted to use high-cost technology modes of violence vice low-cost technology modes of 
violence. Realistically, had they used their AK-47’s in the Tokyo subway attack in March 
of 1995 the attack would likely have been more destructive and more effective. An 
interesting corollary to this is that when biological weapons proved ineffective, they 
switched to chemical weapons and not the arguably more reliable choice of conventional 
weapons.211 This is likely because Aum’s narrative and strategy were dependent upon the 
belief that the Apocalypse would be brought about by advanced weaponry. In other words, 
attacking the subway with AK-47s would have been disruptive to Aum’s narrative to the 
point that it might have introduced disequilibrium into Aum’s constituency. This finding 
is relevant to the original question of whether non-state actors will reach for technology 
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merely because it is available. The finding indicates that this group reached for modes of 
violence that would allow them to reinforce their narrative while also affecting the group’s 
strategies. Which is contrary to CSAL and the Chechen separatists who reached for more 
destructive low-cost technology modes of violence while Aum limited themselves to less 
destructive high-cost technology modes of violence.  
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As stated in the introductory chapter, the goal of this thesis is to better understand 
the puzzle regarding the types of technology that VNSAs will adopt.212 The purpose of the 
research design was to allow identification of variables affecting the selection of specific 
modes of violence, whether low-cost or high-cost, with the added goal of contributing to 
the field of predictive assessments for future VNSAs. As seen in the preceding case studies, 
the independent variables of goal and audience needs affected the selection of specific 
modes of violence in the case of the CSAL and Aum Shinrikyo; however, in the case of 
the Chechen separatists, only the audience needs shifted though that seems to have been 
sufficient to effect the dependent variable. Notably, except for the Aum case in which a 
stated predilection existed for advanced technologies each case showed that even when the 
actors had the option to pursue high-cost technology options they chose to continue their 
use of low-cost technology options, though the destructive capacity of their choices shifted. 
Both the Chechen separatists and CSAL had access to high-cost technology options and 
yet with one exception (the dirty bomb that Basayev tipped to the reporter) neither used 
them.  
While these cases are by no means representative of every past, current and future 
violent non-state actor, they do present evidence that even the most violent of the non-state 
actors are not in the business of adopting technology merely for technology’s sake. Rather, 
each actor was driven and constrained by its goals and narrative as well as their disparate 
audience needs (see Figure 4). Significantly, in each of the three cases the actors 
constrained themselves. In the case of Aum, this constraint was likely due to the 
inconsistency of other modes of violence with their narrative; in the case of the Chechen 
separatists, due to the demonstrated inefficiency of using the more destructive modes of 
violence as a strategic tool; and for CSAL, due to a combination of their lack of belief in 
their narrative and minus an existential threat in the form of government countermeasures. 
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Figure 4. Pathway to mode of violence. Figure repeated from page 8 for 
readers’ convenience.213 
Returning to the original puzzle, analysts and policy makers have little predictive 
capability regarding which groups may seek to adopt newly available technologies. When 
applying the results of the case studies, three things are clear: (i) There is a clear correlation 
between the independent variables and the dependent; (ii) Less constrained actors do have 
constraints upon the modes of violence that they choose; and, (iii) Less constrained actors 
are more likely to change their goals and therefore their mode of violence in response to 
perceived persecution. These findings substantiate the idea that less constrained actors are 
more likely to reach for more destructive capabilities but that the technology that they reach 
for must be consistent with their goals, narrative and audience needs. 
The substantiation of need for technology use to be consistent with their goals, 
narrative and audience needs is demonstrative of the necessity for policy makers and 
analysts to fully understand the VNSAs who they hope to interdict. This understanding will 
allow analysts to predict the signaling strategy inherent to the choice of technology by 
VNSAs.214 Additionally, as the technological pathway shortens, and VNSAs have the 
option to more easily obtain high-cost technology modes of violence, it is vital for policy 
makers and analysts to understand potential points of intercession or influence. This would 
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introduce the potential to prevent high-cost technology acquisition by effecting the 
behavior of the audiences of these VNSAs or preventing a goal shift that could act as 
impetus for escalation. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy makers, their advisors and analysts often have minimal understanding of the 
goals and audience needs that drive the choice of modes of violence among VNSAs. While 
it is not realistic to expect analysts and policy makers to be able to monitor every non-state 
actor with the potential for violence, a baseline knowledge of the VNSA continuum of 
violence and their pathway to disparate modes of violence is. While the figures in this thesis 
are a simple framework, they could be used as an effective aid to scope analysis and 
prioritization of the groups that need to be more closely monitored. Further, they could be 
used to establish red-lines and prioritization efforts among agencies responsible for 
monitoring VNSAs.  
The establishment of red-lines and prioritization efforts could be used as a tool to 
coordinate national and international efforts to mitigate these actors. Namely, the 
coordination of terrorism policy that does not further radicalize constituencies and does not 
precipitate the group’s evolution into more destructive modes of violence. As illustrated 
by Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce, by independently choosing their terrorism policies 
nations are potentially exporting attacks to third party nations.215 For instance, U.S. over 
reactions to terrorist activities have precipitated a reality in which a majority of the attacks 
it experiences takes place in countries where they have little ability to affect the group that 
carried out the attack.216 A basic understanding of the pathways by which a violent non-
state actor will escalate to more destructive modes of violence and potentially reach for 
emerging or radical leveling technologies could lead to enhanced national and international 
coordination to identify and interdict these groups and their access to such technology.  
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